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Though the Japanese banking system has been the focus of numerous empirical studies, 
there is scant empirical evidence on the characteristics of loan contracts between Japanese firms 
and their banks. This paper incorporates relatively new, contract-specific data on bank loans to 
large borrowers to help fill this gap. Specifically, we examine how loans to Japanese companies 
compare with loans to similar non-Japanese companies, and how loans to Japanese borrowers 
vary according to the nationality of the bank making the loan. We then gauge the value of bank 
loans to Japanese borrowers by estimating abnormal stock price returns around the announcement 
of new bank loans. 
Roughly two decades have past since Japan began deregulating its financial sector. The 
period since then has been tumultuous for both banks and their borrowers.
1 During the 1980s, 
large, high-quality firms migrated from banks to capital markets, forcing banks to lend to a wider 
scope of customers. Much of the new lending went to small firms and to the real estate sector, 
substantially increasing banks’ credit exposure. Bank earnings declined through the beginning of 
the period and then fell precipitously after the collapse the Japanese asset price “bubble” around 
1990. Today, Japanese banks continue to be plagued by severe asset-quality problems and low 
profitability. Non-financial firms have fared no better. Over the last ten years, firms have 
experienced lower growth, profitability, and productivity than their peers in other developed 
countries. Average bankruptcy rates are currently at a near all-time high and large, listed firms are 
declaring bankruptcy at rates that are unprecedented by Japanese standards. 
Against this background, an analysis of the lending practices of Japanese banks could 
yield insight into several important questions. First, why have Japanese banks remained so 
unprofitable? Banks from other developed nations have experienced record profits over the last 
10 years as Japanese banks languished. The data collected for this paper allow us to compare the 
                                                           
1 Hoshi and Kashyap (2000; 2001, chapters 7 & 8) provide an in-depth overview and analysis of the 
problems currently afflicting the Japanese financial sector.   2
pricing of loans to Japanese borrowers with the pricing of borrowers from other countries, 
controlling for the riskiness of the loan.  
Second, how has the nature of lending to large borrowers changed with deregulation? The 
migration by large borrowers to non-bank financial sources could have induced Japanese banks to 
offer new types of loans and services to maintain some relationship with their best customers. For 
instance, banks might now concentrate on methods of financing—such as commitment lending— 
that are not easily substituted by capital market financing. Loan commitments are the primary 
mechanism that large non-Japanese banks use to lend to large borrowers and generate much of 
the non-interest income accruing to these banks.
2 Banks could now also rely on customers that— 
though large—are riskier prospects than before deregulation. Our data enable us to track the types 
and (to some extent) riskiness of loans being offered to large borrowers from the 1980s to 
present.  
Third, are bank loans valuable to Japanese borrowers—that is, does a borrower’s stock 
price react positively to the announcement of a new bank loan in Japan? Ample U.S. evidence 
indicates that stock markets respond favorably to announcements by firms of new bank loan 
agreements, leading researchers to argue that bank lending is somehow “special” because 
announcements of other forms of corporate financing are typically greeted with negative or zero 
changes in stock prices.
3 Yet, it is a-priori unclear how investors will greet a new bank loan in 
Japan. On the one hand, given their historically close relationships with borrowers, Japanese 
banks may be valuable “inside stakeholders” that can efficiently screen and monitor borrowers, in 
which case a new loan could convey positive information. On the other hand, the mismanagement 
                                                           
2 James and Smith (2000) report that out a sample of 15,661 loans to medium and large-sized borrowers 
made between 1987 and 1997, 84% contain a loan commitment component.  
 
3 James (1987) finds that announcements of private debt placements generate negative, but insignificant 
abnormal returns. Wruck (1989) obtains a similar result for private equity placements. Preece and 
Mullineaux (1994) and Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1994) show that announcements by the borrower 
of bank-type loans offered by non-bank institutions can generate positive abnormal returns similar to a 
bank loan announcement. 
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implicit in a decade of poor loan quality may suggest that Japanese banks are unable to properly 
screen and monitor new loans. Indeed, a loan renewal may convey bad information about a 
borrower when banks are more likely to refinance their poorest quality loans, a situation that 
might arise when banks are impaired, as in Japan. Impaired banks avoid costly increases to loan 
loss provisions by rolling over loans that should be classified as non-performing. 
We analyze data from two samples of Japanese bank loans. The first sample is obtained 
from Loanware, an archive of loan deals from around the globe. The sample contains 874 loans to 
Japanese borrowers dating back to 1980, though nearly two-thirds of the observations come from 
the last three years in the sample, 1999-2001. Loanware is primarily marketed as a source of 
information for banks that want to participate in loan syndicates. The second sample contains 110 
public loan announcements made by large Japanese firms. These announcements are gleaned 
from news articles and company press releases over the period 1999 to 2001.  
Though highly detailed in nature, there are several reasons why our data might not 
properly represent the typical loan to a Japanese business. First, data on loans to large firms are 
likely to differ from loans made to small and medium-sized firms, which today represent a 
growing share of the business at Japanese banks. Second, the Loanware data likely overstate— 
even for large firms—the importance of syndicated lending in Japan, which has grown in 
popularity but still represents a small fraction of total lending in the country [footnote]. Similarly, 
syndicated loans dominate the set of loan announcements. Third, Japanese loans are 
underrepresented in Loanware relative to other developed countries. The 874 Japanese loans are a 
small fraction of the 120,000 deals available in the database. Fourth, the methods Loanware uses 
to collect loan information makes it hazardous to draw conclusions based on time series patterns 
in the data. For instance, the larger quantity and improved accuracy of observations in the latter 
years of the database likely reflects both improvements in disclosure that have led to better 
sampling and changes in the global structure of bank lending. Separating these two effects will be 
challenging. Despite these drawbacks, we believe the data provide an important glimpse at the   4
nature of loans to Japanese borrowers. Indeed, a separate goal of this paper is to identify some of 
the pitfalls in using these types of data. 
[SUMMARY OF RESULTS] 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the 
Loanware database and compares the representation of Japanese borrowers in the data set to 
borrowers from some other developed nations. Section 3 compares contract characteristics of 
Japanese borrowers to borrowers in other developed nations. Section 4 reports the results of the 
analysis of stock price reactions to loan announcements. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Overview of Loanware 
 
Loanware is a global database that tracks loan contracts on medium and large-sized 
borrowers. It is used primarily by banks interested in participating in loan syndicates, or for 
obtaining detailed information on particular segments of the syndicated loan market. Dealogic, a 
company owned jointly by Euromoney Publishers and Compusoft Software, maintains the 
Loanware database. A typical record in Loanware includes the borrower’s name, industry, 
nationality, and a variety of credit ratings; the loan type, amount, maturity, purpose, pricing and 
fee information, and whether or not the loan is secured with collateral; the identity of bank(s) 
arranging the loan, and the identity other banks participating in the loan. Records are created for 
each “tranche”, or part of a loan, and any one loan deal, or “facility” in Loanware parlance, can 
contain multiple tranches.
4 The information currently fed into Loanware can come from a variety 
of sources, including government filings, company annual reports, and public news releases, but 
Dealogic obtains most of the data—particularly for borrowers outside the U.S—directly from the 
banks arranging the loan deals. These banks compete for positioning in “league tables” and 
therefore have a strong incentive to document as many deals as possible. For loan data predating 
                                                           
4 The Dealogic terminology differs from that of its competitor, Loan Pricing Corporation, which maintains 
the Dealscan database. In Dealscan, a “facility” refers to an individual component of the loan (i.e., a 
Loanware “tranche”), not the entire loan deal.  
   5
the early 1990s, Dealogic relies on information from stories in archived editions of Euromoney 
and Euroweek. For that reason, the pre-1990s data should be treated with extra caution. Loanware 
contains some “traditional” bilateral loan observations, but syndicated loans clearly dominate the 
database. 
Table 1 reports the distribution across years of the 874 loans to Japanese borrowers on 
Loanware through 2001. The table also reports similar distributions for borrowers from France, 
Germany, the U.K, and the U.S, and for the entire Loanware universe. In subsequent tables, we 
will use the combination of observations from the four countries—France, Germany, U.K., and 
U.S—to create a benchmark for comparison with Japanese borrowers.  
U.S. borrowers dominate the Loanware universe, accounting for over half of all the 
observations. U.K. borrowers are also well represented, comprising about 7% of the total 
universe. The relative preponderance of observations from the U.S. and U.K. reflects the 
popularity of syndicated borrowing in these two countries. By comparison, according to the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS), claims on U.S. and U.K. borrowers represented XX% and 
YY% of the global total, respectively [GET FROM BIS]. With the exception of the years 2000 
and 2001, Japan has the fewest borrowers in the data set of the five countries listed in Table 1, but 
over the entire sample period Japanese borrowers are about as well represented as German 
borrowers. Total claims on borrowers these two countries represent ZZ% (Japan) and KK% 
(Germany). The fact that these two countries have large banking systems, yet contribute relatively 
few borrower observations to the data set, likely reflects the countries’ strong reliance on bilateral 
loans rather than syndicated loans.  
Table 1 also reports the yearly proportion of Japanese loans in which the lead arranging 
bank is foreign. A foreign bank has its primary headquarters or a parent bank located outside of 
Japan. The pattern in the table hints the “evolution” in the collection of Japanese loans by 
Loanware. In the early part of the sample, foreign lenders arrange nearly all of the loans. 
Apparently, Japanese banks were reluctant to divulge information on their (mostly) bilateral bank   6
relationships. Japanese-led loans begin to appear in 1988 and constitute at least half of the sample 
thereafter. But the Japanese-led loan records fail to identify most their borrowers by name until 
after 1997, suggesting banks provided information conditional on borrower anonymity. After 
1997, this practice ceases and all borrowers are identified by name. Around 1997, Dealogic 
changed its reporting policy and required that the borrower be identified as a condition for having 
a loan deal count towards a bank’s league-table score.  
[Bridge/Summary here?] 
3.  Comparing Japanese loan contracts to benchmark contracts 
 
We now turn to examining specific characteristics of Japanese loan contracts. In Table 2, 
we compare the Japanese loan contracts to contracts from French, German, U.K., and U.S. 
borrowers. We will often refer to the latter group as the “benchmark” borrowers. We look at 
annual values of five separate characteristics related to the loan contract or the borrower, (1) the 
median Moody’s current issuer rating for the borrower, (2) the median loan amount, in millions 
of U.S. dollars, (3) the median loan maturity, in years, (4) the proportion of loans that are secured 
with collateral, and (5) the median loan premium (including facility and usage fees), measured in 
basis points above LIBOR in the currency in which the loan is denominated. The values of these 
characteristics are based on fields directly available in Loanware.  
Not all borrower records contain complete information for every characteristic. The 
bottom of Table 2 lists the number of observations and percentage of all records available for 
each characteristic over the sample period. Only 32.3% of the Japanese borrower records contain 
a Moody’s rating, while 19.5% contain LIBOR pricing information. Similarly, 21.5% of the 
benchmark borrowers have a Moody’s rating and 55.8% contain LIBOR pricing information.
5 
                                                           
5 A firm must, at minimum, have had outstanding long term debt to be rated to have a current Moody’s 
issuer rating. Although Loanware contains information on other credit ratings, the current Moody’s long 
term field contains, by far, is the most populated. Some records also contain pricing information that use 
benchmarks other than LIBOR, including other interbank offer rates, such as TIBOR (Tokyo), HIBOR 
(Hong Kong), or EURIBOR (Euro market), or a bank prime rate. However, these observations are 
relatively infrequent.   7
Such censoring could bias some of our measures. For instance, estimates of borrower credit 
quality are likely to be biased upward since borrowers with a Moody’s rating have issued public 
debt on an international market and are therefore likely to be of a higher credit quality than non-
rated borrowers. Nevertheless, conditional on their availability, our measures have the advantage 
of being consistently measured across borrowers in all countries, which provides a meaningful 
means for comparison. 
Japanese borrowers in the sample are rated to be less risky, on average, than borrowers 
from the four other developed nations.
6 The average of the median Moody’s ratings for Japanese 
borrowers over the entire sample period is Baa1, compared with an average between Baa2 and 
Baa3 for the benchmark countries. A rating of Baa3 is the lowest rating a firm can receive and 
still be considered “investment grade.” The relative difference in risks between borrowers in 
Japan and the benchmark countries holds for most years in sample. For instance, the median 
benchmark borrowers over the years 1990-2001 are rated “junk” while the median Japanese 
borrower is still rated investment grade. Japanese loans are also tend to be larger, on average, 
than loans in the other countries.  
The average maturity of the Japanese loans is slightly longer than the benchmark loans 
over both the entire 1980-2001 period and over the 1990-2001 subperiod. However, in recent 
years, the median maturity of Japanese loans has dropped to one year, which is substantially 
below the 3-5 year median among the benchmark countries. There are several potential 
explanations for the change in Japanese loan maturities. First, the fraction of loans made under 
commitment increased drastically in the late 1990s (a point which we return to below), and loan 
commitments tend to be of a shorter maturity than traditional term loans. Still, the median 
maturity of loan commitments in the benchmark countries (not shown) is greater than one year. 
Second, Basel Accord rules exempt the undrawn portion of one-year (or less) loan commitments 
                                                           
6 We calculate average Moody’s ratings by converting the ratings to a linear integer scale (i.e., Aaa = 1, 
Aa1 = 2, . . ., C = 21).   8
from capital charges—that is, the undrawn portion of the commitment receives a zero-weight in 
calculating risk-weighted assets. Because Japanese banks have been capital-constrained since the 
late 1990s, they have a strong incentive when offering loan commitments, to offer them at a one-
year maturity. Third, Japanese banks might offer shorter maturity loans to manage their exposure 
to poorly performing borrowers. Requiring an annual renewal would aid a bank’s ability to 
monitor a troubled borrower and allow the bank to quickly reject a borrower that is judged too 
impaired to continue. Alternatively, short-maturity loans make it easier to rollover loans to 
troubled borrowers, thus avoiding being forced to classify the loans as non-performing. Such 
“evergreening” practices are reportedly common among Japanese banks. 
Japanese loans are also much less likely to be secured with collateral than the benchmark 
loans. This feature of the sample is surprising given that Japanese banks have tended historically 
to emphasize collateral value when making loans. One potential explanation for the finding might 
be that Japanese banks rely on buildings and land for collateral, whereas the collateral backing the 
types of loans in Loanware—inventory, receivables, etc.—are uncommon in Japan. Under this 
scenario, Japanese banks would rely on other contract characteristics (such as the maturity of the 
contract) to manage risk.  
Finally, the interest premium charged on Japanese loans above LIBOR tends to be much 
smaller, on average, than the premium charged on benchmark loans. These differences are 
especially apparent after 1990, where the average Japanese loan premium of 80 basis points is 
less than half the 164 basis point benchmark loan premium. The difference in the amounts 
charged on the loan could be due to differences in risk. The average benchmark Moody’s credit 
rating of Ba1 is two notches lower than the average Japanese rating of Baa2, and the benchmark 
loans are smaller and more likely to be secured, which could indicate that the loans made to 
benchmark borrowers are riskier.  
On the other hand, the differences in loan prices could also reflect differences in how 
loans are priced in Japan after controlling for the riskiness of the borrower. Japanese banks have a   9
reputation for foregoing adequate risk pricing in favor of competing to gain – or retain – market 
share. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that Japanese banks deserve this reputation. In the 
1980s, international banks complained that Japanese banks could price more aggressively because 
Japanese regulators allowed their banks to maintain relatively low levels of regulatory capital. 
More recently, Japanese banks, and the analysts that follow them, have cited intense domestic 
competition, combined with the implicit government guarantee to allow no more banks to fail, as 
the primary reason that banks have not improved their ability to adequately risk-price loans. In 
addition, banks may keep prices low to weak borrowers, either because strong relationship 
commitments hinder the ability to terminate the loan, or because the bank wants to keep the loan 
“performing” to avoid having to hold reserves against losses on the loan. Overall, the fact that 
banks have been so unprofitable for so long—and that profit outlooks for the near future are so 
dismal – suggests that Japanese banks are pricing loans below profitable levels. 
The case would be more striking if loan pricing differences existed between Japanese and 
foreign bank on loans to Japanese borrowers. Table 3 provides summary statistics of the loan 
characteristics of Japanese borrowers, sorted by whether the lead arranging bank was Japanese or 
foreign. Interestingly, the statistics in the table suggest that foreign lenders tend to lend to 
observationally less risky borrowers than Japanese banks. Borrowers from non-Japanese banks 
are rated higher by Moody’s and have larger loans with longer terms to maturity. Moreover, there 
is less dispersion, as measured by standard deviation, in the risk characteristics across the non-
Japanese loans, compared with the Japanese loans. But foreign banks charge higher loan 
premiums, on average, than Japanese banks do. The median spread of LIBOR for non-Japanese 
banks is 75.0 basis points during the 1990-2001 period compare with 47.5 basis points for 
Japanese banks. Pricing by non-Japanese banks also exhibits more dispersion than Japanese 
banks. Foreign loan prices have a standard deviation of 72.4 basis points compared with only 48.6 
basis points in the prices of Japanese banks. Additionally, non-Japanese banks also tend to require 
collateral much more often than the Japanese banks.    10
The results in Table 3 suggest that non-Japanese banks charge higher prices and are able 
to vary their prices more to Japanese customers than Japanese banks. Why are foreign banks not 
priced out of the Japanese market? There are two potential explanations. First, high quality 
Japanese borrowers may be willing to pay a premium for loan approval from a high quality bank. 
Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) show that borrower stock price reactions to loan 
announcements are positively related to the quality of the lending bank, as measured by the 
bank’s credit rating. Indeed, some Japanese banks are precluded from borrowing from their own 
country’s banks. Internal guidelines at Sony Corporation, the large Japanese electronics maker, 
actually prohibit the company from borrowing from any bank with a Moody’s bank financial 
strength rating of “C,” which is well above the highest-rated major Japanese bank (Dvorak, 
2001). Second, the Japanese market could be segmented into firms that foreign banks are willing 
to lend to, i.e., high-quality firms, and firms that only Japanese banks are willing to finance, i.e., 
unprofitable firms with pessimistic future prospects. Somewhat perversely, interest rates in the 
Japan-only market could be lower than the high-quality market because the poor quality firms 
that are kept alive in the Japan-only market are unable to pay high interest rates.  
First, Table 4 attempts to estimate the price differences while holding other risk variables 
constant. Using the sample of loans to Japanese borrowers, we regress the loan premium on a set 
of control variables, plus a foreign bank dummy variable that equals one when the lead arranging 
bank is non-Japanese and zero for loans Japanese banks. The idea is to see whether the foreign 
bank dummy is significantly negative after controlling for characteristics related to the riskiness 
of the loan. Our control variables start with the four other characteristics listed in Table 2: 
Moody’s current issuer credit rating (converted to a linear integer scale), the U.S. dollar loan 
amount, the loan maturity, and a dummy variable set equal to one if the loan is secured. We then 
add a dummy variable set equal to one when the borrower is a non-financial corporation, a 
dummy variable set equal to one when the type of loan is a loan commitment, and three time   11
dummies that separately identify the periods 1980-84, 1985-89 (the intercept captures the impact 
of the 1995-2001 period). 
Our regression specification is problematic for two reasons. First, it is likely that we omit 
relevant firm-specific variables that proxy for the riskiness of the borrower. For example, we 
include no measure of the firm’s size (though loan amount will be positively correlated with firm 
size), stock market measures of risk such as beta, or any firm-level leverage measure. Second, the 
contract-specific characteristics included as right-hand side variables are likely to be correlated 
with the regression error term because the values of the contract variables are determined 
simultaneously with loan price. Correct estimation would require that we use instrumental 
variables. For now, we simply recognize that our estimates are likely to reflect simultaneity biases 
and note that they should be interpreted with caution. 
The first two regressions include all 169 observations that have pricing information on 
the borrowers. In these regressions, the foreign bank dummy is statistically significant and 
indicates that, holding the other variables constant, foreign banks charge Japanese borrowers 
about 25 basis points more above LIBOR than Japanese banks. If we exclude observations that do 
not have ratings information, the pricing differences between foreign and Japanese banks become 
much smaller and statistically indistinguishable from zero. In fact, the average loan premium on 
loans to Japanese borrowers with a loan rating is higher than for borrowers not rated, despite the 
conjecture that un-rated borrowers are likely to be more risky.  
[SOMETHING ON THE EXPLOSION OF LOAN COMMITMENTS 
4.  Stock price reaction to loan announcements 
 
[STILL TO COME] 
5. Conclusion 
 
[STILL TO COME]   12
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1980 5 1.00 16  17  35  59 1,120 
1981 7 1.00 22  13  35  133 1,552 
1982 9 1.00 38  4  41  139 1,665 
1983 11 1.00 30  12  37  134 1,243 
1984 10 0.80 32  19  88  255 1,789 
1985  3  1.00  26 8 146  270  1,533 
1986  10  0.70  40 25 194  271  1,501 
1987  6  0.83  61 18 333  736  2,209 
1988  11  0.55  82 8 515  1,293  3,186 
1989  11  0.45  53 30 576  2,268  4,436 
1990  14  0.36  56 24 481  3,132  5,409 
1991  3  0.00  43 14 365  3,653  5,891 
1992  15  0.60  49 29 405  4,947  7,229 
1993  18  0.28  45 26 465  4,394  6,919 
1994  17  0.35  59 36 682  5,009  8,062 
1995  23  0.35  84 57 585  5,289  8,859 
1996  51  0.29  74 55 432  6,584  10,267 
1997 41 0.49 103  60  474 7,287  11,492 
1998  28  0.89  56 42 388  4,946  10,067 
1999 76 0.50 272  123  714 7,977  9,126 
2000 173 0.27 241  107  727  5,277 9,065 
2001 332 0.11 244  154  649  4,081 7,786 
Total 874 0.58  1,726 881  8,367 68,134  120,406 
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 Table 2: Comparing Loans to Japanese Borrowers with Loans to Borrowers in Benchmark Countries.  
   
  Median Moody’s rating 
of borrower 
Median loan amount 
(millions U.S. $) 
Median maturity 
(years) 
Proportion of loans 
that are secured 
Median loan premium 


































1980 Baa2  Baa1 106  45  8  5  0.40  0.03  --  63 
1981 A2  Baa1 10 75  5  5 0.00  0.02  50 55 
1982 A3 A2  30 65  3  7 0.33  0.01  88 55 
1983 Baa1  Baa1  24  70  4  5  0.00  0.06 50  59 
1984 Baa2  Baa1  40  75  4  5  0.10  0.05 80  55 
1985 Baa1 A3  25  90  2  5  0.00  0.03 125  34 
1986 A3 A2  46 91  4  5 0.00  0.02  100 34 
1987 Baa1  Baa1  90  100  4  5  0.00  0.07 75  36 
1988 Baa3  Baa2 100 100  4  5  0.18  0.08 50  75 
1989 A3  Baa3 74 46  1  5 0.00  0.09  25 150 
1990 A2  Baa3  150 31  5  4 0.00  0.10  38 125 
1991 A2  Baa2  500 24  9  3 0.33  0.26 -- 143 
1992 Baa3  Baa2  74  25  12  4  0.00  0.35 40  150 
1993 Baa3  Baa3 100  40  12  3  0.11  0.38 50  150 
1994 Baa3  Baa3  39  45  10  4  0.06  0.35 138 150 
1995 Baa3  Baa3  59  52  7  5  0.00  0.34 48  150 
1996 A3 Ba1 17 50  6  4 0.06  0.37  113  165 
1997 Baa1 Ba3  33  60  6  4  0.15  0.36 150 161 
1998 Baa1 B1  120  63  1  5  0.21  0.38 70  175 
1999 Baa2 Ba3  139  73  1  4  0.18  0.39 88  200 
2000 Baa1 Ba2  113 100  1  3  0.06  0.30 70  200 
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Table 3: Comparing Loans to Japanese Borrowers from Domestic and Foreign Banks 
 


















Sample: 1980-2001      
Domestic Lenders           
Median    Baa2 52.58  1.00  48.75       
Mean    Baa2 295.03  3.30  63.16    0.02  0.53 
Std Dev    3.0 notches  834.80  3.48  45.91       
Number of observations    141 594  557  32       
                
Foreign Lenders                
Median    Baa1 92.05  3.00  75.00       
Mean    Baa1 213.84  3.53  94.41    0.16  0.39 
Std Dev    2.4 notches  401.16  3.42  69.26       
Number of observations    140 275  255  137       
                
Sample: 1990-2001                
Domestic Lenders                
Median    Baa2 51.03  1.00  47.50   
Mean    Baa2 295.20  3.30  67.65    0.02  0.53 
Std Dev    3.0 notches  843.14  3.50  48.64   
Number of observations    138 577  544  25       
      
Foreign Lenders      
Median    Baa1 114.22  2.00  75.00   
Mean    Baa1 254.64  3.38  98.14    0.18  0.44 
Std Dev    2.5 notches  444.45  3.54  72.44   
Number of observations    101 213  203  117         16
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Time Dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.  R-squared  0.044 0.212 0.247 0.343 
Number of 
Observations 
169 169  88  88 
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Table 5: Proportion of Loanware Observations that are Loan Commitments, 1980-2001 
 
        
Year Japan France  Germany  U.K.  U.S. 
1980  0.00  0.13 0.00 0.09 0.46 
1981  0.00  0.23 0.00 0.17 0.32 
1982  0.11  0.05 0.00 0.20 0.40 
1983  0.27  0.03 0.00 0.22 0.51 
1984  0.20  0.19 0.11 0.22 0.40 
1985  0.33  0.27 0.00 0.31 0.49 
1986  0.10  0.58 0.16 0.35 0.59 
1987  0.33  0.62 0.17 0.50 0.56 
1988  0.36  0.77 0.00 0.52 0.57 
1989  0.55  0.45 0.17 0.38 0.53 
1990  0.21  0.23 0.25 0.39 0.56 
1991  0.33  0.12 0.43 0.35 0.59 
1992  0.07  0.31 0.14 0.33 0.57 
1993  0.06  0.42 0.19 0.40 0.68 
1994  0.00  0.20 0.17 0.38 0.70 
1995  0.13  0.50 0.40 0.42 0.64 
1996  0.04  0.43 0.35 0.42 0.64 
1997  0.02  0.39 0.47 0.42 0.64 
1998  0.50  0.29 0.45 0.45 0.62 
1999  0.59  0.39 0.32 0.44 0.59 
2000  0.70  0.33 0.40 0.41 0.62 
2001  0.63  0.32 0.29 0.40 0.67 
Annual 
Average 
0.25  0.33 0.20 0.35 0.56 
 
 
 